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Abstract This paper presents an analysis of attitudes
towards everyday tracking and recording technologies
(e.g., credit cards, store loyalty cards, store video cameras).
This work focuses on both institutional and end-user
tracking and recording technologies. In particular, this
paper describes (1) an empirical interview and survey study
of everyday institutional tracking and recording technolo-
gies and (2) an analysis of these empirical data against a
framework originally used to describe tension points for
end-user tracking and recording technologies. Results from
the study demonstrate that people can be highly concerned
with information privacy while simultaneously reporting
significantly less concern regarding the use of everyday
technologies that have the capabilities to collect, process,
and disseminate personal information. The empirical
results and theoretical analysis identify and begin to
explain this dissonance. Furthermore, we provide exten-
sions to the analytic framework for capture and access
technologies to address differences, similarities, and
interplay between institutional and end-user tracking and
recording technologies. The results of this paper contribute
to the fields of personal and ubiquitous computing by
providing significant insight relevant to the evaluation,
design, deployment, and adoption of new tracking and
recording technologies.
Keywords Information privacy  Tracking and
recording technologies  User attitudes  Institutional 
End-user
1 Introduction
Two common research themes in ubiquitous computing are
automated capture and access [44] and context-aware
computing [1, 38]. Their application spans a variety of
domains including education [7, 16], healthcare [3], inter-
personal relationships [8, 31], personalization [29], and
automation [47]. These applications require the tracking
and recording of large amounts of domain and problem-
specific data about individuals and their surroundings, a
situation that inherently engenders concerns about the use,
re-use, control, protection, and potential abuse of those
data. Although tracking and recording technologies1
(TRTs) hold the potential to advance these research areas
and address a myriad of domain problems, they may also
invoke a variety of privacy-related concerns.
Thus, researchers in Ubicomp have long investigated
privacy-related issues and concerns surrounding TRTs.
These investigations have often uncovered generalized
concerns about the recording that is inherent in Ubicomp
systems (e.g., [2, 21, 41]). At the same time, however,
other investigations have indicated that people are not
concerned with many new Ubicomp technologies (e.g., [8,
35]). There is, however, a distinction amongst the TRTs,
which have been thus far treated as one group of Ubicomp
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1 Though combined into one group in this paper, tracking and
recording technologies are not interchangeable. Not every tracking
technologies record (e.g., GPS) and not every recording technologies
track (e.g., voice recordings).
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applications. The distinction is between institutional and
end-user TRTs. We use the term institution here somewhat
broadly, invoking Berger and Luckmann’s notion that
institutions are any ‘‘reciprocal typification of habitulized
actions by actors’’ [5, p. 54]. Institutions inherently mod-
ulate the options available to individual action, and thus,
TRTs controlled by these entities need to be examined in a
different light than those controlled by individual end-
users. End-user TRTs are installed and used by individuals
and groups of end-users. For example, the Personal Audio
Loop (PAL) [17] is a mobile device for augmenting human
memory through a short buffer of recorded audio. As
another example, the Whereabouts Clock [8], although
framed as an awareness tool, involves the gathering of
location data for members of a family. Certainly, end users
are operating and making choices on their use of TRTs
within the constraints of a myriad of such institutions and
their perceived cultural norms. In this analysis, however,
we purposefully differentiate the reactions to and under-
standing of TRTs developed, deployed, and controlled by
those ‘‘collectivities containing considerable numbers of
people’’ and bringing about social control [5, p. 55] from
those TRTs adopted by and used primarily towards the end
goals of individuals or small groups whose membership is
minimally defined and often dynamic.
This paper expounds on the differences in affordances,
features, understanding of and reactions to these two dis-
tinct types of TRTs. In Sect. 2, we present the empirical
methods that serve as the basis of this analysis. This study
focused on eliciting specific concerns regarding specific
technologies in the concrete context of everyday retail and
financial transactions. During this investigation, we also
interrogated more generalized current attitudes towards
TRTs. Finally, we examined how attitudes in specific
contexts with regard to specific technologies may or may
not relate to or depend upon general information privacy2
concerns. In Sect. 3, we describe the results of this
empirical investigation. Participants in the study reported
high levels of information privacy concerns but much
lower levels of concern for TRTs in retail transactions and
in other everyday activities. The results presented identify
and begin to explain this discrepancy. In Sect. 4, we
engage the differences and similarities between end user
and institutional TRTs by examining the results of these
empirical data against a set of seven tension points devel-
oped from previous empirical work surrounding end user
TRTs [14, 19]. Using this framework, we further analyze
the potential tension points in the design, use, and policies
surrounding the studied institutional TRTs, noting where
the framework breaks down and extending it when
necessary to consider the particular concerns of capture
technologies implemented and used by larger institutions.
This work identifies and specifically interrogates ways
perceptions are constructed around both institutional and
end-user TRTs. This distinction enables new understanding
about the design and use as well as policies around TRTs.
The results of this work contribute to the personal and
ubiquitous computing community in understanding and
supporting the evaluation, design, deployment, and adop-
tion of both novel and known institutional and end-user
TRTs.
2 Method
We used a mixed-methods approach to study how indi-
viduals in two areas of the United States experience,
perceive, and understand a variety of everyday TRTs.
Specifically, we studied attitudes towards credit cards,
store loyalty cards, electronic toll collection systems, web
server records, store video cameras, and radio frequency
identification (RFID). These technologies by no means
include every tracking and recording device; however,
they are ubiquitous, mostly well known, and represent a
broad sampling of technological capability and contextual
use.
In addition to being ubiquitous, these specific technol-
ogies were chosen because they are also capable of—and in
fact for most of their domain uses require—tracking and
recording. For example, people use credit cards for a
multitude of reasons. Some use them for the convenience
of not having to carry around physical cash money. Some
use them to gain greater purchasing power. Whatever the
reasons, however, credit card companies record every
purchase made using a credit card. In fact, it is those
records that in some cases encourage people to use the
services (e.g., monitor spending to stay within budgets).
Those records include not only the amount of money
exchanged in the transaction, but also data such as the date
and location of the transaction as well as the names and
other information about the parties involved in the trans-
actions. As another example, the second technology in
focus in this work, store loyalty cards, is marketed as
mechanisms for shoppers to receive discounts. When used,
they record data such as when the purchase was made,
where the purchase was made, and every item purchased
during that transaction. Likewise, electronic toll collection
systems are often perceived to save their users time and
money, because they offer a discount and expedited pas-
sage through the toll. When used, they record the time and
location of the devices that pass the tollbooths. Unlike
these more specific technologies, we also probed under-
standing of and attitudes towards web servers, which
2 Information privacy refers to ‘‘the ability of the individual to
personally control information about one’s self’’ [39].
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provide a seemingly endless array of information. Web
servers record every visit made to them, including the IP
address of the visitor, a timestamp of the visit, the previous
page, and the page requested. Likewise, although situated
in a narrowly constrained place, store video cameras cap-
ture a wide variety of rich information, including the
activities of shoppers in their field of view, that can be
processed to track individual shoppers as they come into
the store and walk about. Despite the enormous amount of
data recorded by these cameras, they are often viewed as
necessary security measures for the sake of the store or in
some cases the customers. Finally, we probed respondents
about consumer level RFID, such as that in use on every-
day items for inventory control. This technology and its use
were relatively novel to participants, with only a small
minority declaring themselves familiar with it. In these
cases, participant experiences with RFID were restricted to
keycards for accessing secured buildings or rooms and tags
in consumer goods. It is not yet clear what can or will be
tracked about individuals using RFID. If tags are not
removed or deactivated from consumer goods, they could
be tracked even at some distance for years after a purchase.
Likewise, the use of tags to open secured areas can have
the added effect of logging an individual’s movements in
new ways that traditional manual keys could not. These
technologies, when considered together, provide a diverse
set of tracking and recording experiences from which to
situate participant responses.
Our approach included the use of a questionnaire to
gauge participant attitudes quantitatively, and a follow-up
interview focused on their rationales for those attitudes. We
recruited participants from seven sites in two distinct
geographical areas in the United States to sample a broad
variety of consumers.
Participation in the study was initially framed as an
inquiry into consumer attitudes towards a relatively novel
Ubicomp technology in the retail space—RFID. Using that
framing as a basis for a more generalized discussion, we
also queried people about a variety of everyday TRTs and
the privacy—related considerations they engender. That is
to say, participants were provided study descriptions that
focused on RFID but questionnaires that covered a variety
of topics. This approach allowed us to poll participants’
attitudes surrounding information privacy, data collection,
data control and data use around a wide variety of tech-
nologies without biasing them towards specific concerns by
using potentially loaded terms like privacy and
surveillance.
2.1 Participants
Fifty-four participants (27 females, 27 males) were
recruited at seven sites during the months of May 2007
through August of 2007. Recruitment was done at a variety
of shopping malls in two primary geographic areas:
(A) a high-end3 outdoor mall, a midrange4 outdoor mall,
and three midrange indoor malls in Southern Cali-
fornia (n = 18), and
(B) a midrange indoor mall and a midrange shopping
center in Southern Louisiana (n = 36).
These two geographic areas were picked based on their
reported census differences.5 Southern California is more
developed and urban; Southern Louisiana is less developed
and more rural. See Table 1 for demographic differences
between the two sites.
Participants represented a wide range of demographic
profiles. They were nearly evenly divided into three age
groups: 18–29, 30–50, and over 51. Slightly over half of
the participants reported being married or in a domestic
partnership (58%); 33% were single; and 9% were sepa-
rated, divorced, or widowed. The highest level of education
achieved for most participants was a high school degree
(59%), but 15% were college graduates with 24% having at
least some graduate school education or having completed
a graduate degree. Individual income levels were again
nearly evenly divided across three intervals: less than
30,000 USD a year; between 30,000 and 60,000 USD; and
over 60,000 USD. We present these demographics pri-
marily to indicate the variety of study participants but also
later highlight those results that appear to be correlated in
some way to this demographic information (see Table 2 for
details of participant demographics).





Median income (2004) (US: $44,334) $58,605 $37,726
Percentage with Bachelors’ degree
or higher (2006)
30.8% 12.3%
Percentage of high school graduates
(2006)
79.5% 67.1%
Caucasian population 78.8% 73.6%
African-American population 1.9% 18.8%
Asian population 16.1% 1%
Median value of owner-occupied
housing unit (2000) (US: $119,600)
$270,000 $80,500
3 High-end malls contain boutiques and stores that cater to designer
brands. These malls have full-service restaurants.
4 Midrange malls are focused on ready to wear brands with a mix of
‘‘food court’’ and full service restaurants. For the sake of complete-
ness, low-end malls emphasize discounts over service and branding.
5 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06059.html and
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22109.html
Pers Ubiquit Comput (2010) 14:53–72 55
123
2.2 Recruitment
We recruited participants in public sitting areas and ‘‘food
courts’’ at each site. Systematically approaching everyone
in the chosen area, we invited every adult (at lease 18 years
of age) to participate in the research study. When every
potential participant in the sitting area or food court had
been approached, we walked to a different end of the mall,
again systematically approaching shoppers. When people
declined to answer the survey and participate in the
interview on site, a flyer was distributed with contact
information to participate at a later time. Areas within each
site were alternated in this manner for every site visit, each
of which typically lasted 3–4 h.
In addition to direct recruitment at these sites (n = 36),
an additional 18 participants were recruited through
snowball sampling—asking participants to advertize the
study to others in their social circles who might be
interested in participating. For the convenience of the
participants, both those, directly recruited and those
recruited through social networks, the survey was also
conducted at people’s homes and places of work (coinci-
dentally, n = 18). However, for safety and to provide a
context of shopping in which many of these everyday
TRTs are currently used, participants were encouraged to
complete the study at the mall. Participants each received a
$10 gift card as compensation for time spent during the
interviews.
2.3 Procedure
When a person agreed to participate, we first asked the
participant about any prior knowledge of RFID or its
applications. Prior knowledge was documented (13% had
prior knowledge), but regardless of any prior knowledge
every participant was then shown the same diagram of
the usage of RFID [47], presented with sample RFID
tags, and given a short presentation to introduce and
explain RFID. Participants were then given the oppor-
tunity to ask any questions about RFID until they felt
comfortable with their understanding of the technology
and its uses. Once all the participants’ questions had
been answered, they completed a pen and paper ques-
tionnaire of 116 questions (described in the following
section). We then conducted a semi-structured interview
using the questionnaire as a guide but allowing the
participant to lead the discussion to topics of individual
interest. The entire process took approximately 45–
60 min per participant.
2.4 Survey apparatus
The survey included four primary sections, with each
section focusing on a different subject:
• RFID
• Information privacy
• Other everyday TRTs
• Demographic data.
The section dedicated to RFID included Boslau’s
questionnaire design [6]. Additional questions focused on
the desirability of potential benefits as well as comfort
level with potential tracking of people and their items by
thieves, strangers, corporations, and/or the government.
The potential benefits presented to participants included
warranties without receipts, returns without receipts, verifi-
cation of authenticity of products, faster checkouts, automatic
microwave cooking instructions, automatic washing machine
instructions, recommendations, and getting information about
product recalls quickly.





Gender Male 50 (27)
Female 50 (27)




Over 60 11 (6)
Race Asian 7 (4)
African-American 9 (5)
Caucasian 80 (43)
Location CA 33 (18)
LA 67 (36)
Marital Status Single 33 (18)




Education level Less than HS 2 (1)
High school grad 22 (12)
Some college 37 (20)
College grad 15 (8)
Some graduate school 7 (4)
Graduate or Prof. school grad 17 (9)
Income level (n = 52) Less than $30K 40 (21)
$30K - $60K 33 (17)
$60K – $100K 13.5 (7)
Over $100K 13.5 (7)
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Section 2 contains the Smith et al. [39] privacy instru-
ment. This instrument is a parsimonious questionnaire
consisting of 15 questions. This section was included to
allow for a comparison of the participants in this study with
those in Smith et al. regarding their attitudes towards
information privacy. This instrument divides information
privacy into four subscales of concern: collection, errors,
unauthorized secondary use, and improper access. The
collection subscale measures the concern that extensive
amounts of personally identifiable data are being collected
and stored in databases. The Errors subscale measures the
concern that protections against deliberate and accidental
errors in personal data are inadequate. Unauthorized sec-
ondary use measures the concern that information is
collected for one purpose but used for another. Improper
access measures the concern that data about individuals are
readily available to people not properly authorized to view
or work with this data. And finally, the overall scale is
the average of all questions that make up the above four
subscales.
Section 3 includes questions about a series of everyday
TRTs to gauge attitudes and concerns regarding these
technologies. The technologies included credit cards, store
loyalty cards, electronic toll collection systems, web server
records, and store video cameras. Questions included the
number of years the participant had used a particular
technology and how concerned the participant was that
records were kept when the technologies were used.
Section 4 includes questions focused on demographic
data. These questions included gender, age, marital status,
number of children, cultural background, ethnicity,
income, educational background, and profession. These
questions were intentionally left to the last section so as to
minimize any potential impacts reflecting on demographic
data may have on responses [43].
2.5 Analysis
We took multiple passes through the data using grounded
theory techniques to build a model for how participants
encounter and understand everyday TRTs [42]. This
approach enabled the use of the qualitative empirical data
we had collected to begin explaining and more deeply
understanding trends observed in the quantitative ques-
tionnaire responses.
We also conducted a comparative quantitative data
analysis, but were somewhat limited by the data reported
by Smith et al. who only reported means, standard devia-
tions, and numbers of participants in their study. We were
only able to perform t tests with the published data in
comparison with the discrete data gathered in this study.
Thus, we present any observed differences between the
results of the studies as only potentially significant.
Specifically, the Smith et al. instrument combines 15 Lik-
ert-scale questions into four subscales, which were the
values reported. For discrete data, t tests can be inappro-
priate and report a significant difference when significance
would be more difficult to report using a non-parametric
test. To verify the significance of differences between the
Smith et al. population and this study’s population, a
comparison of the discrete data would be necessary.
Within the results collected here, we used standard
statistical measures to identify trends of interest, which are
reported in Sect. 8 of this paper. T tests were used if the
variables were normally distributed. For non-normal data,
non-parametric tests were used. For example, for correla-
tions, Pearson’s r was calculated for normally distributed
data, while Spearman’s rho was calculated for ranked data.
The results of these comparisons are described more
completely in Sect. 8.
3 Results
In this work, we focused on six ubiquitous tracking and
recording technologies: credit cards, store loyalty cards,
electronic toll collection systems, web server records, store
video cameras, and RFID. With the exception of RFID and
electronic toll collection systems (which is an active RFID
system), most participants had used or experienced all of
these technologies for multiple years. Most participants
declared themselves to be familiar with electronic toll-
collecting systems (n = 43, 80%), but very few had
installed them in their cars (n = 10, 19%). Fewer partici-
pants described themselves as familiar with RFID (n = 7,
13%). These numbers confirm that RFID is a novel tech-
nology. The other five technologies (including electronic
toll collection) can be categorized as everyday technolo-
gies. This distinction becomes important in understanding
the results of this work, because experiences with everyday
technologies are so impactful on both how people construct
meaning around those technologies but also in how they
model and understand new technologies when they first
encounter them or when they first begin to learn of them.
The remaining sub-sections include quantitative results
indicating participants’ levels of concern towards infor-
mation privacy and towards everyday TRTs. Thereafter,
we present results from interviews that explain some of the
observations from the numerical data.
3.1 Attitudes towards information privacy
The participants in this study reported similar or even
higher levels of concern towards information privacy than
those measured by Smith et al. [39], using the same privacy
instrument as those authors (see Table 3). As noted in the
Pers Ubiquit Comput (2010) 14:53–72 57
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analysis section, the differences presented in Table 2 are
only potentially significant. For a more conclusive com-
parison and analysis with the Smith et al. population, the
original data from those studies are required. Unfortu-
nately, Smith et al. only reported the means, standard
deviations, numbers of participants, and very little infor-
mation regarding demographic data. There are a multitude
of potential explanations for the differences observed, none
of which can be guaranteed to be accurate. Some issues,
do, however, stand out and so are worth noting here. First,
the differences in the ‘unauthorized secondary use’ and the
‘improper access’ subscales (and consequently the ‘overall’
scale) may be attributable to time. Smith et al.’s study #1
was done in Fall of 1992. Studies #2 and #3 were done in
Spring of 1993. Data for this study were collected in Spring
and Summer of 2007. There is a span for almost 15 years
between the studies. In that time, the world has experienced
massive increases in e-commerce, email, and use of the
Internet in general. These increases have also brought a
greater awareness of threats such as identity theft and
phishing. Interestingly, many have argued that over time
so-called privacy concerns will diminish as we habituate
to a world in which we are watched and tracked [11, 25, 27,
30]. These data, however, potentially tell a different story,
one in which increased exposure may actually be increas-
ing the concerns people report for general information
privacy.
Furthermore, the demographics of the participants in the
various studies differ. Smith et al.’s first study sampled a
group of graduate business students from an east coast
American university. Their second study sampled under-
graduates from an east coast American university. Their
third study sampled American members of an international
IT governance professional association. Gender and age
distributions of the three studies are not reported. In our
study, however, the intent of this study was to sample
shoppers in general, thus only a small subset of the par-
ticipants were students or professionals similar to Smith
et al.’s population.
Within the demographics of our subject population,
most groups responded similarly to one another on the
information privacy subscales. The only significant
Table 3 Comparison of Levels of Concern on a 7-point Likert scale (higher values indicate higher concern) between the average level of
concern reported by the participants of in this study and the average of the Smith et al. studies [39] reported in 1996
Privacy subscale l (r) l (r) l (r) l (r)
This study
(n = 54)
Smith et al. study #1
(n = 146)
Smith et al. study
#2 (n = 183)
Smith et al. study #3
(n = 337)
t test with this study t test with this study t test with this study
Collection 5.39 (1.21) 5.28 (1.19) 5.11 (1.04) 5.45 (1.16)
p = 0.564 t = 0.096 p = 0.726
t = 0.578 1.673 t = 0.351
df = 198 df = 235 df = 389
Errors 5.68 (0.90) 5.36 (1.06) 5.57 (0.99) 5.46 (1.11)
p = 0.050 p = 0.465 p = 0.167
t = 1.970 t = 0.732 t = 1.385
df = 198 df = 235 df = 389
Unauthorized secondary use 6.54 (0.65) 5.77 (1.22) 5.74 (1.14) 6.15 (1.07)
p = 0.001 p = 0.001 p = 0.010
t = 4.408 t = 4.921 t = 2.6009
df = 198 df = 235 df = 389
Improper access 6.40 (0.63) 6.10 (0.89) 5.83 (1.01) 5.90 (1.01)
p = 0.024 p = 0.001 p = 0.001
t = 2.274 t = 3.925 t = 3.527
df = 198 df = 235 df = 389
Overall 6.00 (0.59) 5.63 (0.78) 5.56 (0.83) 5.74 (0.86)
p = 0.002 p = 0.001 p = 0.033
t = 3.165 t = 3.632 t = 2.141
df = 198 df = 235 df = 389
The three right columns list the results of a two-tailed unmatched t test between the participants of this study and the population measured by
Smith et al. P values, t values, and degrees of freedom are provided. Significant p values (\0.05) are shown in bold. With respect to the ‘overall’
privacy scale, participants reported significantly higher levels of concern for information privacy than the levels found in the previous three
Smith et al. studies
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differences uncovered were in the ‘overall’ scale with
respect to location (t(52) = 1.7811, p \ 0.05, one-tailed t
test) and gender (t(52) = 2.5037, p \ 0.01, one-tailed t
test). That is, participants in California reported being more
concerned than participants in Louisiana, and female par-
ticipants reported being more concerned than their male
counterparts. Interaction effects could also be observed.
Across all subscales, women in California reported being
significantly more concerned than their male counterparts:
collection (t(16) = 1.70, p \ 0.05), errors (t(16) = 5.73, p
\ 10-6), unauthorized secondary use (t(16) = 1.80,
p \ 0.05), improper access (t(16) = 2.53, p \ 0.05), and
especially overall (t(16) = 5.18, p \ 10-6), all one-tail t
tests. In contrast, there were no significant differences in
gender for the Louisiana population.
3.2 Attitudes towards everyday tracking and recording
technologies
Participants rated their levels of concern with the five
studied everyday TRTs: store loyalty cards, credit cards,
security cameras, electronic toll collection, and web serv-
ers. Ratings were given regarding concerns about each
technology on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from
‘‘strongly agree’’ (7) to ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1) (see
Table 4 for the specific wording and numerical results of
these ratings). With the exception of web server records
(l = 4.43, r = 1.90), participants reported low levels of
concern for the records kept by everyday technologies that
were studied. These levels of concern are strikingly lower
than the levels of concerns reported when participants were
asked about information privacy (see Fig. 1). Furthermore,
the responses indicate a discrepancy between the stated
generalized information privacy concerns and the stated
concerns for some everyday TRTs.
The levels of concerns of the everyday TRTs are not
only different when compared to the level of concern
for information privacy, they are also different among
themselves [Pearson v2(24) = 46.7399, p = 0.004).
Unsurprisingly, this result suggests that concern levels
change depending on the type of technology queried. More
interestingly, responses to all of the everyday TRTs are
correlated positively with responses to at least one other
technology (see Fig. 2). Store loyalty cards, web servers,
and credit cards have a strong correlation (0.6 \ r or
q\ 0.8) to each other, suggesting that participants tend to
treat these three technologies similarly. Cameras have a
moderate correlation (0.4 \ r or q\ 0.6) to store loyalty
cards and credit cards. Electronic toll collection is mod-
erately correlated (0.4 \ r or q\ 0.6) to store loyalty cards
and web servers. Last, not only are the levels of concern for
information privacy different from the levels of concern for
everyday TRTs, they are also not significantly correlated to
any of the studied everyday TRTs. These correlations
suggest avenues for future research in exploring how these
technologies, and people’s understandings of them might
be related to one another.
3.3 Attitudes towards RFID
In addition to assessing how people have come to understand
and use everyday TRTs in relation to their generalized
understandings of and concerns about information privacy,
one of the goals of this work was to interrogate a common but
Table 4 Concern for everyday technologies on a 7-point Likert scale
(higher values indicate higher concern)
Technology l (r)
(n)
Credit card 3.65 (1.71)
‘‘I am concerned that my credit card
purchases are recorded.’’
n = 52
Store loyalty cards 3.47 (1.71)
‘‘I am concerned that my purchases at
stores can be tracked when I use
their loyalty card.’’
n = 49
Electronic toll collection 1.93 (1.68)
‘‘I am concerned that the electronic
toll collection system has a record
of my trips on the toll roads.’’
n = 43
Web server records 4.43 (1.90)
‘‘I am concerned that websites have a
record of my activities when I visit
them.’’
n = 53
Store video cameras 2.85 (1.87)
‘‘I am concerned about the
surveillance cameras in stores.’’
n = 54
Fig. 1 Information Privacy Concerns versus Everyday Tracking
Technologies Concerns box plot (higher values indicate higher
concern). In this figure, the much higher concern for information
privacy over any of the specific everyday TRTs can be easily seen
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relatively unknown ubicomp technology. In this case, we
chose RFID to serve as that technology. The results of this
work indicate that RFID is relatively unknown within this
subject group. Of the 54 participants, only seven participants
(13%) reported knowing anything about RFID previously.
This percentage is comparable to the two Spiekermann
studies, in which 14 and 19% had heard of RFID previously
[41], but is low in comparison with the 23% of US partici-
pants who reported being knowledgeable with RFID in a
Capgemini study [9] or the 38% of US participants in the
Queen’s University international survey on surveillance and
privacy [49].
The majority of participants responded that the potential
benefits of RFID outweigh its potential costs (70%, 38 out
of 54) with l = 5.11, r = 1.91, where ‘‘strongly agree’’ is
7 and ‘‘strongly disagree’’ is 1. The remaining participants
were divided evenly between being neutral (15%, 8 out of
54) and reporting that costs outweigh benefits (15%, 8 out
of 54).
The survey also included questions about concerns
about tracking through RFID by four different entities:
strangers, the government, thieves, and companies. For
each entity, participants also responded to a question about
three different aspects of tracking: ‘‘[entity] finding out
what RFID-tagged items I buy,’’ ‘‘[entity] finding out what
RFID-tagged items I wear or carry,’’ and ‘‘[entity] tracking
where I and my RFID-tagged items go.’’ The results of the
three questions are averaged to produce a level of concern
for each entity (see Table 5; Fig. 3). Furthermore, these
results indicate that the stated information privacy concerns
and the stated concerns for tracking by RFID are more
similar than the stated concerns of everyday tracking
technologies.
Despite the high levels of concern observed for RFID
tracking by stranger, government, thieves, and companies,
those levels are still significantly different from the levels
of concern reported for information privacy (see Table 5).
A one-way ANOVA shows that there are differences
among the four entities (F(3, 194) = 2.74, p B 0.05). This
result suggests that the reported levels of concern are
dependent on the entity doing the tracking. Moreover, the
entities are correlated to each other (see Fig. 4). Reported
concern for tracking by thieves is moderately correlated to
reported concern for tracking by government (r = 0.4151,
p \ 0.01). All other pair-wise comparisons are strongly
positively correlated (r [ 0.6, p \ 0.0001). These corre-
lations suggest that the levels of concern participants have
about RFID tracking are somewhat stable regardless of
who is doing the tracking. Reported concern for informa-
tion privacy is weakly positively correlated to RFID
tracking by strangers, government, and thieves (all r \ 0.4)
Fig. 2 Correlations of Everyday TRTs *p \ 0.002, all other
p \ 0.001. Dotted lines indicate a moderate positive correlation;
solid lines indicate a strong positive correlation. For completeness,
both Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho are calculated and presented
Table 5 Concern for RFID tracking on a 7-point Likert scale (higher
values indicate higher concern)
RFID Tracking by l (r) Compare to ‘overall’
Information Privacy
6.00 (0.59)
Strangers 5.18 (1.43) p = 0.0000
t = 4.4591
df = 53
Government 4.91 (1.79) p = 0.0000
t = 4.7860
df = 53
Thieves 5.45 (1.55) p = 0.0086
t = 2.7292
df = 53
Companies 4.50 (1.67) p = 0.0000
t = 4.9985
df = 35
Fig. 3 Information Privacy Concerns versus RFID Tracking Con-
cerns box plot (higher values indicate higher concern). In this figure,
the concerns for RFID tracking are high and more aligned with the
concern for information privacy
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and not significantly correlated to tracking by companies.
Finally, when asked to weigh the potential advantages and
the potential disadvantages of RFID, the majority of par-
ticipants reported favoring the potential advantages. This
response is not correlated with concern for information
privacy (p = 0.2707), but is moderately negatively corre-
lated to overall RFID tracking (r = -0.4993, p \ 0.001).
This result suggests that even though participants are
concerned about the notion of being tracked, they still
favor the potential advantages over the potential disad-
vantages, such as the ones described in the questionnaire.
3.4 Comfort with recording and tracking technologies
During the analysis of the qualitative empirical data col-
lected during this study, three overarching themes
surrounding comfort with everyday TRTs were identified:
1. Threat comprehension
2. Expectations of privacy
3. Situational dynamics
This section details each of these themes and present
empirical evidence demonstrating their impact on the
attitudes of interview participants.
3.4.1 Threat comprehension
Participants reported a clear understanding of potential
benefits of recording and tracking technologies. For
example, they nearly all commented on the ease of use of
credit cards for shopping. They were approached during in
a shopping area and so may have been more readily pre-
disposed to be considering credit cards in depth. However,
at the same time, they struggled to articulate possible costs
or threats of these very same technologies. For example,
participants often struggled to describe any problems with
credit card records. Only after being pressed repeatedly in
most cases would they comment on identity theft, credit
card abuse and so on, never mentioning the potential for
building long-term records of their purchases or other
threats commonly discussed in the discourse on privacy
and consumer technologies [24]. Several participants also
commented that they had not spent much time thinking
about how such records could negatively affect them. For
example, when asked about web sites recording visits, one
participant commented: ‘‘I’ve never given it a single
thought. I mean, I’ve known about it…But yes, it just it’s
never been a concern.’’ Likewise, when asked how data
tracked through store loyalty cards might be used, another
participant commented: ‘‘I’ve actually never thought of
that.’’
Of those who had given the records previous consider-
ation, a common response was that such records were
mostly irrelevant or harmless. For example, when asked
about the records produced through store loyalty cards, one
participant acknowledged an abstract potential threat, but
commented how they are relatively harmless:
You mean how much coffee I drink? That’s relatively
harmless I think. Some information can be harmless.
Some can be detrimental, depending on how it’s used.
Knowing how many coffees I buy, I don’t see a
problem with that personally.
Records were often reported to be benefits, rather than
risks or costs. A credit card record could be proof that a
purchase was made in the event that the shopper needed to
return it or apply for a warranty. Several participants
described uses of electronic toll collection records as alibis
or otherwise relating them to legal actions that would
require evidence of a person’s location. Recording and
tracking of everyday activities were often reported to be
irrelevant or harmless as compared to other potential
threats, such as thieves. For example, commenting on
credit card records, a participant said:
Well, personally I don’t think it affects me negatively
in any way. But if somebody would take my card or
steal it and use it to get funds off of there, then it
would be very helpful to have that information so that
I could get it back.
Despite struggling to articulate the potential costs and
risks, participants did often present the impression that they
should be concerned. As one participant commented, ‘‘I
know I should be concerned, but I don’t know why.’’
Although some participants intoned that they should be
concerned, others avoided thinking about the threats,
despite acknowledging fear of the situation. For example,
for one participant the best coping strategy for dealing with
ambiguity about the use of information in store loyalty
cards, was simply to ignore it:
Fig. 4 Correlations of Tracking Entities dotted lines indicate a
moderate positive correlation; solid lines indicate a strong positive
correlation. There is a correlation among the entities, but the levels of
concern are not the same
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You know, I have no idea, and that scares the crap out
of me. But I don’t really… I don’t really think about
these things.
Finally, participant comments also indicated inaccurate
mental models of the inner workings of technologies,
which may have further contributed to challenges in
understanding the potential threats of these technologies.
This phenomenon is aligned with the findings of Patil and
Kobsa, in which participants with an inaccurate mental
model of the underlying technology of instant messaging
were less concerned about privacy issues [34]. In our work,
however, an opposite phenomenon was primarily observed.
Those participants with inaccurate models of the workings
of the technology tended to assume a more dangerous
position than is correct, perhaps explaining why RFID was
rated to be of more concern than electronic toll collection,
which is a specific and known RFID technology. When
queried about web server records, participants frequently
commented that ‘‘hackers’’ could get their information,
thus causing items like cookies to be of concern to them.
Although hacking is a legitimate security threat, web server
logs do not contain passwords or other account informa-
tion. Despite this technological impossibility, concerns
about web tracking technologies were significantly more
common than the other everyday TRTs queried, such as
pervasive video surveillance, which participants tended to
understand more accurately.
All but one participant reported that recording and
tracking technologies were not problematic for people who
are ‘‘not doing anything wrong’’ or have ‘‘nothing to hide.’’
For example, in response to questions about video sur-
veillance cameras, one participant commented that the
cameras were there for: ‘‘… keeping track on the bad guys.
If you’re a good guy, you’ve got nothing to worry about.’’
Although this attitude is not necessarily surprising [40],
it represents an important challenge in the discourse and
design surrounding TRTs as well as in their evaluation.
Even when people are obeying laws and ‘‘doing the right
thing,’’ they may still have secrets or wish to negotiate the
boundaries of information dissemination with friends,
coworkers, strangers, and even institutions [33].
3.4.2 Expectations of ‘‘privacy’’
The majority of participants commented that in public,
particularly in shopping spaces such as the ones in which
this study took place, it is unrealistic to expect any level of
‘‘privacy.’’ Commonly deployed technologies like video
surveillance cameras and closed circuit television (CCTV)
were frequently viewed as pervasive but nevertheless per-
missible TRTs. This result echoes some of the results of
other researchers more specifically focused on CCTV [20,
26, 28]. This attitude was compounded when the TRTs
were included as part of a service. For example, the records
created as part of the electronic toll collection—both those
from the RFID scans and the photographs of each license
plate as drivers proceed through the gates—were seen as an
inherent part of service use. Many participants commented
that the recording was a small price one had to pay to get
the services.
Participants also largely seemed to hold the belief that
tracking and recording was not of great concern because
problems will be taken care of by some other entity, be it
the government or even some higher power. Although
some participants reported trusting corporate information
use to be regulated by the government, corporations were
often seen as having the highest potential to abuse the
information they were collecting. Some behaviors imagines
by the consumers we interviewed were considered abuses
even though technically legal. For example, when asked
about the possible uses of the records, one participant
commented:
I don’t think it’s used to help consumers; I think it’s
used to find consumers, to target consumers. I think
very few corporations use their abilities to help
consumers… it’s a profit business.
When asked about the same issue, another participant,
with a less negative attitude towards corporations, was not
as concerned. As we will describe in the next section,
attitudes (particularly trust) towards the tracking and
recording entity affect an individual’s attitudes towards the
technology itself. For this participant, he is not concerned
as long as:
Well as long as the corporations like had loyalty to
the customers and didn’t really like divulge infor-
mation like unlawfully. And so, I guess as long as
there’s like codes and regulations making it like
illegal to do so.
As exemplified by the previous quote, it was common
for participants to expect the government and the law to
protect them. This expectation is not unique to the par-
ticipants in this study; the feeling of being protected by
the law can also be seen in the Queens University survey
on surveillance [49]. Of those who indicated in that
survey that they are knowledgeable of laws that protect
personal information in government departments, 51%
thought those laws were either very effective or some-
what effective. Of those who considered themselves
knowledgeable of laws that protect personal information
in private companies, 51% thought those laws were either
very effective or somewhat effective (coincidentally,
the percentages are identical but not the specific
respondents).
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Another commonly reported belief is that individuals
would be hidden in the large databases. This deindividua-
tion in a crowd was often reported to be a protection
against threats. For example, in describing comfort with
web server records, one participant noted:
There are so many people doing it that it doesn’t
matter, so, that’s the way you look at it. That’s the
way my brother described it. He’s a programmer. He
goes, ‘‘Who cares.’’ Too many people. So you just get
lost in the crowd.
3.4.3 Situational dynamics
General beliefs may not always coincide with beliefs in
specific situations (see Figs. 1, 2). In fact, a specific goal of
this study was to bridge the gulf between generalized notions
of information privacy and specific behaviors by examining
attitudes about specific situations, in this case everyday
tracking and recording in shopping contexts. As shown
before in different domains, users’ stated beliefs do not
always coincide with their actions (e.g., [23, 45]). Although
we do not capture actual behaviors in this work, garnering
reactions in specific contexts can be a step towards bridging
that gap. The Smith et al. instrument [39] queries participants
about information privacy in general. However, when asked
about specific TRTs, participants reported being less con-
cerned than in the general case. Moreover, when asked about
tracking via RFID, a technology that participants believed to
be novel and rare and that has no specific, common usage yet,
they replied with similar higher levels of concern as when
asked about general information privacy. This suggests that
answers are dependent on the situation.
Situational context has an impact in reported attitudes—
not only the context of the specific product and service but
also the context of the people, institutions, places, and
activities surrounding any interaction with those products
and services. For example, the participants in our study
reported not to be concerned with the tracking and
recording of store loyalty records. However, they reported
being significantly more concerned about web server
records. Without knowing the true costs and benefits,
participants bring different knowledge and models into
appraising a level of concern for that particular situation or
technology. When asked, a participant explained his
understanding of what happens with web server records:
‘‘It can affect it if the information that I provide is
somehow pirated by someone who’s not authorized to
receive it. I’m concerned about the […] pirates. I
wouldn’t want any pirating and take the information
and use for a bad purpose because there are lots of
pirates there on the Internet.’’
A lack of options may be another factor in risk assess-
ment. Participants reported using the Web despite concerns
of being tracked, because there were no other options if
they wanted the online information or services. Participants
also reported using store loyalty cards despite concerns
because they could not afford not getting the discounts.
Therefore, without other available options, people may be
‘‘forced’’ to use a particular technology or service nulli-
fying any other risk or cost analysis done in relation to the
benefits or necessities.
Analysis of the level of effort required alongside the
level of concern and the likelihood of having an impact was
also reported to influence attitudes. Participants considering
circumventing tracking, and recording often commented
that it may not be worth the effort. For example, one par-
ticipant described being concerned about the presences of
cameras in hotels. When asked if that meant he would not
stay at hotels with cameras, he responded: ‘‘No, it’s not like
I’m going to sit there and search for the only hotel in Las
Vegas that doesn’t have surveillance cameras.’’
Thus, as exemplified in this account, depending on the
particulars of a situation (e.g., options that are perceived to
be available), concerns may be raised or lowered.
3.5 Discussion of results
Explanations for the discrepancy between participants’
attitudes towards everyday TRTs and their fears and con-
cerns are grounded in the data and reveal the three factors
described in detail in this section. First, many people may
not understand the collection, processing, and dissemina-
tion of recorded consumer data (threat comprehension).
Second, they may not carry a ‘‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’’ to use the legal terms (expectation of privacy).
And last, some situations are likely to provoke more con-
cern and action than others (situational dynamics). These
three major factors are laden with other issues, some of
which are influenced by more than one of these factors at
once, however, and are worthy of more discussion:
• General notions of privacy versus specific technologies,
• Novel versus everyday technologies, and
• tracking and recording that is done by end-users versus
those done by institutions.
The ability to gather reliable, grounded, and accurate
responses from individuals about privacy and related con-
cerns in information technology continues to be a struggle
within the Ubicomp community. The nature of the ques-
tions in the study or the nature of the technologies studied
themselves will likely always be factors in identifying
potential concerns, whether designing or evaluating ubi-
comp technologies. In this study, we asked participants
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about general concerns for information privacy. However,
in the same study, we also asked them about specific
technologies. The specific technologies queried were not
reported to be bad or unwanted technologies. The partici-
pants, in fact, favored many of the technologies and the
services they provide, not unlike other ubicomp technolo-
gies that are studied in quasi-controlled deployments and
are providing a positive experience for the participants
(e.g., the Whereabouts Clock [8], eClass [7], and Tivoli
[36]). Thus, when asked if these ‘‘positive’’ technologies
are of any concern, participants may be less willing to say
so. Contrast these studies with those in which participants
had less positive or even negative experiences with the
services provided, and there may be an effect on the level
to which the non-functional concerns and requirements
became of greater importance (e.g., Active Badge [46] or
Virtual Kitchen [22]).
The challenges between reactions to specific technolo-
gies and generalizable questions and concepts are likely
impacted by all three of the factors described in detail in
previous sections. When discussing general concerns, it
may be difficult for people to imagine and comprehend
much less verbalize the specific threats engendered by a
wide range of technologies. On the other hand, when
dealing with specific technologies, these threats may be
more comprehensible but not generalizable, thereby
skewing the results. Likewise, expectations of privacy may
be extremely specific based on technology used and the
legal and culture norms of their environments. For exam-
ple, audio recording is tightly legally regulated, whereas
photography may be less so in many states. This example
leads directly into the issue of situational dynamics.
Clearly, discussions about general concerns are unlikely to
consider situational dynamics unless participants sponta-
neously offer detailed examples or the researchers are
careful to include such questions and probe them directly.
Even when discussing specific technologies, however, few
are limited to a small set of likely situations and still
require careful planning of the research questions to
include issues of situational dynamics. Overall, the chal-
lenge of asking appropriate research questions to get at the
needed level of specificity, familiarity, and so on is likely
to continue to be a challenge for the ubicomp community
as more and more technologies that inherently include
tracking and recording become part of research and
commercial agendas, warranting substantial further
investigation.
As ubicomp technologies become more and more
engrained in everyday experiences—in the form of mobile
phones, mobile music players, ultra-large screens embed-
ded in the physical environments, GPS units in cars and
phones, and more—the Ubicomp research community is
left with the challenge of understanding concerns related to
information privacy, the control of data, and so on with
both novel research technologies and those that have been
adopted en masse. Novel technologies may not have exis-
ted long enough for people to understand and be aware of
possible risks and threat models—the so-called ‘‘novelty
effect’’ of research deployments. However, length of
experience does not necessarily add to understanding and
awareness of risks and threats of a technology. The
potential for differences between novel and familiar tech-
nologies is important to consider moving forward and
again crosses multiple factors described in the previous
sections.
In this study, we queried individuals about both every-
day familiar technologies and a relatively novel one. In his
analysis of tracking and recording technologies for elder-
care, Beckwith reported that the participants in that study
did not understand the technology [3]. Beckwith showed
that people are not capable of understanding the privacy
tradeoffs of novel technologies. This study echoes his
points and demonstrates that people do not comprehend the
tracking and recording capabilities of novel technologies
like RFID, and furthermore not of everyday technologies
either. Therefore they are likely not capable of under-
standing the privacy tradeoffs of everyday technologies
either. In contrast to the short-term interaction with novel
technology in the Beckwith study, participants of this study
have used the everyday TRTs regularly for multiple years.
Even then, they struggled to identify and verbalize risks
and threats incurred from these technologies. Use of these
technologies on a daily basis without incident likely
influences perception of risk. The current lack of incidents
may also impact expectations of privacy. Tracking and
recording is often seen as an integral part of familiar
technologies. Having regularly interacted with the records
themselves (e.g., credit card statements), people under-
stood recording to be an unavoidable if not beneficial part
of the service they were using. They do not have the
technical knowledge to conceive the service without the
use of TRTs. This belief of being unable to separate the
service from the tracking and recording often carried over
in participant discussions about novel recording technolo-
gies as well. Thus, the situational dynamics may not
depend so much on the ‘‘novelty effect’’ as they may
depend more on one technology being different from the
next, novel or otherwise.
Finally, the entity doing the tracking and recording—
whether an end-user, group of end-users, or a major insti-
tution—may also be a factor in the rationale for assessing
concern. In this work, we focused on institutional TRTs.
The focus of much of the Ubicomp community on capture
and access applications [1, 44], which are in large part
dependant upon end-user TRTs, lends itself to analysis of
the differences between these types of TRTs. Again, these
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issues are observed across all three factors described in the
previous section. By classifying the TRTs in this study
according to what institutions and people might control
them and have access to the records they create, people
were able to incorporate their feelings about those institu-
tions and individuals into their comprehension of threats.
Expectations of privacy are not static [4, 33] and may be
substantially influenced by differences in experiences with
individuals as opposed to institutions as well as the specific
situations being considered at the time. This final issue of
examining differences between institutional and end-user
TRTs is an area for substantial future research. In the
following section, we explore this issue further by ana-
lyzing the data from this study about institutional TRTs
against a framework initially designed for end-user TRTs.
4 Comparing end-user and institutional tracking
and recording technologies
We previously proposed a framework through which one
can attempt to design adoptable capture technologies and
against which one can evaluate their impacts that included
seven tension points: ownership of data; choice; visibility
and awareness of recording, archival, and deletion; trust;
features of rich media; face; and decision point [14]. This
framework, like much of the research in capture and access
applications, was only applied to what we call end-user
TRTs. In this section, we use this framework to examine
the studied institutional TRTs, noting where the framework
breaks down and extending it to consider the particular
concerns of TRTs implemented and used by larger
institutions.
4.1 Ownership of data
Knowing who owns and controls the data can allow people
to use other methods of negotiation outside of the tech-
nology itself to influence when and if recording takes
place, the use of data, and so on (e.g., talking to the owner
about what is saved and requesting the stopping of
recording). In the case of institutional TRTs, the owner of
everyday TRTs and data are often large institutions, such
as the government or a corporation.
Negotiating with these types of institutions can often be
limited or challenging for a variety of reasons. First, these
entities may be laden with bureaucracy making it difficult
to even find the correct person with whom to discuss any
concerns. Second, the available resources of a large entity
compared to those of an individual are inherently imbal-
anced, passing the imbalance on to the negotiation
possibilities. In end-user capture and access applications,
some of these phenomena can also be present. For
example, the owner—even if another individual—may
have more power than those who may be subjected to the
recording (e.g., teacher’s aides being recorded in class-
rooms at the whim of the teachers [15]), but this
phenomenon can be exacerbated when considering large
institutions. Finally, common physical indicators of own-
ership and use, such as where the data are stored, can be
hidden in these cases with data storage amounting to trade
or government secrets in many cases.
Additionally, even if end-users can identify who initially
owns their data and negotiate with those entities, the data
can be collected by one corporation and sold or shared with
another. Many people, in fact, reported that this kind of
sharing was assumed:
‘‘If you give it to one, the rest of them can get it.’’
In the results of this work, people most often brought up
this concern when considering things that might inconve-
nience them. For example, people reported being worried
that a corporation who bought such data would eventually
send spam or junk mail or in some way profit from these
data.
‘‘Because I think what I decide to do, what I decide to
buy is my business and anyone who wants that
information is only using it for their benefit and
they’re using my lifestyle as a means to make more
money for them and I’m not being compensated for
that, nor am I being asked for my permission to do
it.’’
If, on the other hand, the company retained sole own-
ership of the data, the threat was often perceived as much
lower. For example, one person noted:
‘‘As long as they don’t share it with anybody, with no
other companies, I don’t think it’s impacting me
negatively.’’
It should be noted that while personal data and records
such as the ones mentioned above may be shared amongst
corporations in the United States, the situation is very
different in the European Union. The EU Directive 95/46/
EC protects individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data. Sharing of such data without prior consent
would be unlawful in the EU.
4.2 Choice
Choice includes being able to opt in or out of a capture-
enabled system or service. The choice may be between
using one service over another. For end-user TRTs, some
end-users have the choice to initiate or block recording. At
the same time, other end-users may have little or no choice.
For example, it is often common practice for college
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students to audio record class lectures. In this situation, the
student doing the recording has control over her recorder.
However, her fellow students have little say in whether
their questions in the class may or may not be recorded.
This disparity in the ability of some stakeholders to make
choices about recording while others cannot is even more
extreme when one considers institutionally controlled
recording. For institutional TRTs, it is the institution that
made the choice to initiate the recording. For example, it is
the choice of corporations and storeowners to install and
record from the security cameras. Thus for the non-con-
trolling end-user, the choices they have are dependent on
the relationship they have to the controlling entity. For end-
user TRTs, end-users without the technology can negotiate
to participate or not. For institutional TRTs, the effective
choice is to use the service provided or to avoid the service.
The choice to be recorded may be made by a consumer
as simply a ‘‘price to pay’’ for making some other choice—
such as using a service.
‘‘If I don’t give them the information, they might not
give the product or service I’m looking for. It doesn’t
matter what I think. If I want a service, I have to
comply with their wishes.’’
These sentiments were echoed in survey and interview
responses describing technologies already in use. Addi-
tionally, when queried specifically about RFID, the least
well known of the technologies studied, one participant
responded that the advantages of the technology came with
a cost. The following is a comment on RFID’s potential for
quicker checkout in the shopping experience:
‘‘You know, if you want to be… to get in and out
quick, then you pay the price no matter what. I mean,
that’s just like anything. You know, you have to pay
for what you want for convenience if that’s what you
want.’’
Although many choices specifically about recording
then are de facto made based on choices made for other
reasons, the ability to choose at some level can still impact
perceptions of these TRTs. For example, in reference to
Electronic Toll Collection technologies, one participant
commented that:
‘‘…I still don’t have a problem with it because that’s
a personal choice. That’s a choice I make to let you
know—you, the collector—know that I’m crossing
this bridge at a certain time every day.’’
Likewise, when considering tracking that may occur
online, one person noted, ‘‘I use the Internet, being aware
of it, that they have that record.’’ Talking about store
loyalty cards, another participant said:
‘‘And in a way you look at it, if it was loyalty card,
you signing up for it to be a member of it, to be a part
of it. So, in one way you’re allowing, like, you’re
agreeing to them that—to be tracked… It becomes,
like, maybe your choice to be monitored for it.’’
Although many people reported that even if they were
not able to make a significant explicit choice, they were at
least able to make the choice as part of a tradeoff analysis
with other services. In other situations, there may be no
alternative but to be recorded. For example, to rent a car in
the United States, one needs to have a credit card. One
cannot opt out of being recorded by a credit card company
when one rents a car. In other cases, people simply do not
have the resources or knowledge to avoid these recordings.
One participant commented on her need to use store loyalty
cards to save money:
‘‘Yeah, I use that because I’m forced into using it…
Ralphs (grocery store) has higher prices, but then if
you don’t use your loyalty card they charge you a lot
of money…’’
Aside from situations in which they simply do not have
the resources to make a choice about recording, people
may actually be able to make such a choice but perceive
that they have no choice. In those cases, particularly in
terms of institutionally controlled recording, people
reported being resigned to being tracked because they
believed the choice is not ultimately theirs to make. Rather,
the institution has already made it for them. As one par-
ticipant expressed:
‘‘I’m realistic enough to realize that no matter what
my wants and feelings are it’s not going to make any
difference out there in the market. So I mean, if they
do it they do it, if they don’t, they don’t.’’
Similarly, people responded that whoever owned the
property owned the rights to make a choice about recording
it, such as in a private store. Thus, any choices to be made
surrounding that recording must be made at a higher level,
such as not frequenting that shop:
‘‘It’s their store. I mean, if they choose to have sur-
veillance, it’s their store. I don’t have to go in there. I
can go shop somewhere else.’’
4.3 Visibility and awareness
Visibility and awareness of recording can have large
impacts on how people respond to that recording. Different
levels of visibility may inherently be built into the tech-
nology or its deployment, sometimes correlating to the
information about and awareness of these technologies that
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those who might be subjected to recording hold. A sig-
nificant point for all of the technologies queried in this
work is that there is virtually no feedback from the trans-
actions and interactions with these technologies. This lack
of feedback sometimes leads to questions of whether the
technology is even working (e.g., if the toll collecting
device is not functional, you are unlikely to know it until a
series of toll violation citations appear in your mailbox one
day). This lack of feedback can also have impacts on
individual concerns about, acceptance and adoption of, or
ignorance regarding everyday tracking and recording in
their lives. As one participant puts it:
‘‘…you’re not reminded every time that you do
something that somebody’s going to be tracking it.’’
As TRTs weave themselves into the everyday fabrics of
our lives, they do indeed become increasingly ‘‘invisible in
use’’ [48]. This invisibility manifested itself in our inter-
views across all of the technologies we queried. Credit
cards, so ubiquitous in everyday interactions, were a par-
ticularly interesting point because of their seamless use in
everyday shopping and financial transactions. For example,
one person commented that recording from credit cards is
‘‘…not something I often think about, but I guess
maybe there was a part of me that was kind of aware,
but I just—you know, it’s just not something you ever
really think about.’’
While visibility and awareness are design issues com-
monly considered with regard to the moment of interaction,
for some participants the effects of the recording could be
seen months after the fact, in the form of increased unso-
licited mail or traffic citations as in the toll collection
example stated previously or in the case of so-called ‘‘red
light cameras.’’ In the case of increasing ‘‘junk mail,’’ the
recipient may not even know what caused the increase in
solicitations.
The majority of participants expressed wanting
increased visibility into the records created about their
activities. In particular, with regard to the creation of new
technologies, people expressed a desire to make those
capabilities and uses more clear in the future. For example,
one person, who had resigned himself that new technolo-
gies are ‘‘going to happen no matter what,’’ still wanted
legal oversight of those technologies:
‘‘They need to pass a law that says ‘no eavesdropping
on RFID unless you give notice.’’’
Despite this push for greater visibility, the results of this
work also echo those of past research in that this desire is
inherently at a point of tension with another significant user
requirement, that of technologies being more ‘‘calm’’ and
less intrusive [14, 48].
4.4 Trust
Acceptability of TRTs may depend on the trust of and the
relationships among the various stakeholders and technol-
ogies involved. That is, trust of an individual for another
individual, for a group, for an institution, or for the tech-
nology itself all can play a role in the acceptance of TRTs.
Trust, in this case, is the individuals’ expectation that their
information will not be misused or abused.
In this work, we have focused on TRTs, primarily per-
ceived to be controlled by two types of institutions:
governmental (federal, state, and local) and business (from
small businesses to major corporations). Inherent trust or
distrust of those institutions can influence perceptions
about recording by these entities. For example, in reference
to RFID and the trust she has placed in the corporation
controlling it, one participant commented on the mecha-
nism that would further enable that trust:
‘‘I mean, yes, it might make things a lot faster, and
yes, it will probably be better for the store; but the
store’s best interest should be the customer. I mean, if
customers are going to feel, you know, that, like
uncomfortable going to the stores they’re going to
lose service.’’
When also asked about RFID tracking, another partici-
pant was concerned about the tracking done by the
government for no reason other than because it was the
government. Asked to expound further, the participant
explained simply:
‘‘Because I’m not a fan of the government.’’
Outside the entities that own or have access of the
data, trust in the technology itself impacts acceptance—
trust that the technology would work or that the tech-
nology was secure. When asked about RFID, one
participant was concerned about the security of the
technology itself:
‘‘I guess the only concern I would have about that
would be the ability for people to hack into there and
be able to get information on someone. But at the
same time, because of the way we can track every-
thing I think we’re more prepared now to be able to
find out who gets in and find them. You know what
I’m saying? So, even if you would get hacked, I feel
that we could definitely find out who it was…’’
4.5 Features of recorded data
The particular types of data, affordances and features of
collected data, and capabilities in aggregate form impact
the way people perceive the TRTs. The data collected by
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the technologies studied in this work include transactional
information that can be associated to particular individu-
als. The data collected are rich in that it contains much
information—about individual consumers as well as
particular groups of consumers. However, for some par-
ticipants, there was a perception that there was actually
not a lot of information in the type of data that was
collected. The data were perceived to be not very useful,
whether it was web server records, credit card records, or
store loyalty card records. Speaking about web server
records and how it can affect one’s life, one participant
said:
‘‘I don’t think—I can’t see it affecting my life any
way, shape or form.’’
One challenge that emerged for technology designers
and policy makers is in how little people reported knowing
and understanding about the features of the data recorded
and the technologies recording them. For example, speak-
ing about store loyalty cards, one participant said:
‘‘I don’t, I mean, I don’t know how much information
they keep… And I think most wouldn’t care if the
grocery store knows what kind of groceries you get.’’
Not knowing the richness of the data collected, another
participant said of credit card records:
‘‘I can’t see anybody would want any of that infor-
mation anyway. Why would that be relevant?’’
Although some participants perceived the data collected
as neither relevant nor important, others sometimes over-
estimated the power of everyday TRTs. One participant
described how satellites could track individuals no matter
where they went:
‘‘Because anywhere you go you’re on satellite so it
doesn’t really matter. You know you can get satellite
views from the Internet at these web sites that you
can actually look at your own house?’’
In the case where people thought little useful data was
collected, they were rightfully not motivated into action.
However, on the other extreme, where the perception is
that one is recorded via satellite everywhere one goes,
people are not motivated into action either, because ‘‘it
doesn’t really matter.’’
Despite the majority of participants wrongly described
at least some piece of technology as being (in)capable of
collecting some data, there were others who described
concerns based specifically on an accurate understanding
of technology’s potential. One participant verbalized a
legitimate concern of the possibility of collecting such rich
data about a person through RFID:
‘‘They could follow me or track my habits… Here
comes more unwanted junk mail… I mean super junk
mail.’’
In this case, acceptance of the technology is not only
dependent on understanding the richness and features of
recorded data, but also the use of that data. That is, the
perceived features and usage of recorded data is another
factor in the acceptance of TRTs.
An interesting feature of recorded data that emerged
from this study and this analysis that differs from
examinations of end-user TRTs is the emphasis on
ability to access the same information using different
data. That is to say, for some people, being documented
or monitored in one way was not a source of concern,
because they determined the same could be accom-
plished in some other way. For example, tracking of
individuals does not necessarily have to be done via
CCTV because tracking individuals’ cell phones could
easily get similar data—in fact, probably more easily.
Likewise, when describing use of store loyalty cards, one
participant noted ‘‘they know what I buy anyway; they
scan it on the register’’
Finally, another interesting finding from examination of
these institutional recordings is found in the very masses of
data that may be of concern to some. For some, the very
richness and quantity of data recorded by these technolo-
gies were perceived as a means of shelter. Many
participants reported comfort in the inability of large cor-
porations to disambiguate their individual data from the
masses. For example, talking about credit card usage, one
participant said:
‘‘There’s so many people buying so much stuff on
credit cards. How would they target one person or
just go look at one person?’’
We had posited in a previous study [14] that richer data
would be more problematic. That may be the case for end-
user TRTs, it does not seem to be the case of institutional
TRTs, as shown above.
4.6 Face
A significant challenge to managing one’s presentation
arises when the ‘‘face’’ presented in one setting can be
recorded, removed, and reinserted elsewhere. Face in this
case is aligned with Goffman’s definition of ‘‘an image of
self delineated in terms of approved social attributes [13].’’
People deal with issues of face and manage impression by
controlling what is presented about them [12]. In the
context of everyday TRTs, without control of what infor-
mation is collected about them, people will not be able to
manage which face is presented under differing situations.
68 Pers Ubiquit Comput (2010) 14:53–72
123
The empirical results of this work indicate that presentation
of data out of context was a pressing concern.
4.7 A few people described wanting to know what data
about them they are being collected. For example,
speaking about how data can be gathered through
RFID wirelessly, one participant commented:
‘‘You don’t have any control regarding what infor-
mation other people can gather from me. It’s
different. Like, if they approach you [in person], they
get this information from you; you know what you’re
giving out.’’
One common concern is to have the recorded data taken
out of context and used inappropriately later. Though there
may be a multitude of reasonable explanations for people’s
actions, taken out of context, records of their actions can be
damaging. As an extreme example, data can be used as
potential for black mail as suggested by one participant:
‘‘Let’s just pick a hypothetical example, a married
person going in there buying condoms. My wife has
had a hysterectomy. Why the hell do I need con-
doms? You can see the potential implications if that
kind of information got into the wrong hands. It’s
potential for blackmail. Suppose I’m on court ordered
program from the court for drunk driving and I’m in
there buying alcohol…’’
One common separation in the practice of controlling
self-presentation and face is the distinction between work
and home [37]. People manage a ‘‘work face’’ when they
are at work and a ‘‘home face’’ when they are at home.
Even in seemingly benign everyday technologies, like
Internet use, these concerns of boundaries between home
and work emerged in the interviews in this study. For
example, commenting on using a computer at work, one
participant noted:
‘‘I make sure I know where I’m at [on-line] when I’m
at work that’s for sure.’’
4.8 Decision point
The decision point for when to participate in recording can
be done at three major points: before recording starts,
during the recording, or after the recording. The decision
points are moments in which the available choices can be
executed. With end-user TRTs, a person decides when to
interact at all three points. With institutional TRTs, the
institution decides when to record and what to record. Once
deployment starts, the institution retains almost all power
over the data.
The only possibility for individuals to execute a choice
is to decide whether to use the system or service provided.
Individuals are at a decision point every time they interact
with or through a service the institution provides. However,
as discussed in Sect. 4.2, not all choices given to con-
sumers and end-users are actual choices. The choices made
at the decision points depend on more factors than just
deciding to opt-in or to opt-out.
With institutional TRTs, the decision points also act as a
means of negotiation between the institution and the indi-
vidual. This negotiation process is thus very limited. There
is no way for individuals to directly negotiate with insti-
tutions. For example, there is no current way for
individuals to set the terms of usage when they agree to use
a technology like the electronic toll collection system. If
they use the system, they will be tracked. As currently
implemented, the system requires the tracking data for
billing purposes.
To extend our framework, the institutions face a deci-
sion point when they implement a TRT. Continuing with
the electronic toll collection example, when it was being
implemented, a decision was made (either explicitly or
implicitly) to model the system after a credit-card-like
system instead of a cash-like system. With a credit-card-
based system, records are kept. If it were a cash-based
system, different (and perhaps less) records would be kept.
Of course, the same can be said of end-user TRTs. A
decision point also exists for that technology during
implementation time. The decision at that point is how
much tracking and recording is necessary to have the
desired functionality.
4.9 Summary of framework application on institutional
TRTs
In this section, we explore how institutional TRTs differ
from and are similar to end user TRTs. Differences include
knowing which entity owns the data collection changes the
perception of the people being tracked or recorded. For
example, dissemination of collected data to other entities
can be perceived as more readily done by an institution than
by an end-user. The perception of having a choice is also
affected by knowing which entity is doing the tracking and
recording. If done by an institution, some people may feel
that the institution has already made the choice for them.
The point at which a decision is made to participate with a
TRT or not is also different between end-user and institu-
tional TRTs. With end-user TRTs, a person can often decide
when to interact. With institutional TRTs, the institution
may have decided when and what to record. For the insti-
tutional TRTs studied, visibility and awareness were
seemingly lacking, whereas they are a common trait of end-
users TRTs [Bellotti 1993]. And last, trust of the entity
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doing the tracking and recording can also be vastly differ-
ent, simply depending on whether that entry is an individual
or an institution. For certain participants, the mere fact that
it is the government makes that entity untrustworthy.
Similarities between end-user and institutional TRTs
include the rich data collected by all entities. The affor-
dances and features of the data collected by either type of
TRTs were often unseen or not understood by individuals
being tracked or recorded. Another similarity is the pre-
sentation of impression management or face. People were
concerned about presenting the appropriate face in both
kinds of TRTs. Specifically, they were concerned about
data of them being used out of context.
Engaging the TRTs through these tension points reveal
to designers and researchers who is doing the recording,
who owns the data, who has access to the data, what data is
recorded, where is the collection taking place, when is the
recording taking place, and why (or for what purpose) is
the recording being done. The framework is helpful in
designing new TRTs—whether end-user or institutional—
and in evaluating current TRTs, but questions about
adoptability of TRTs remain.
5 Conclusion and future work
In the last decade, research in Ubicomp has investigated
many privacy-related issues and concerns surrounding
TRTs. Some studies have uncovered general privacy con-
cerns; at the same time, other investigations have indicated
that people are not concerned with many new Ubicomp
technologies. Far from claiming that there is a single
answer to these potentially conflicting findings, the results
of this study demonstrate that people can simultaneously be
concerned about data tracking and recording while using
these technologies and services on a regular basis.
Researchers have used a variety of arguments to rec-
oncile the discrepancy between these two sets of research
findings. Hayes et al. [18] described factors that together
influence people’s decision making about a specific audio
and video recording installation. Consolvo et al. and others
describe how people might be trading their data and
information for the value provided by the product or ser-
vice [10, 32]. A similar argument is that if people are
already using these technologies, then they have already
consented to the tracking and recording that is a part of
these technologies. This argument is based on the premise
that people will protest if they object to new technologies,
as was the case in an organized boycott of Benetton
products following the announcement of a new embedded
RFID program for their clothing line.6
Although these conceptions of the acceptance of
recording and tracking in everyday life are important and
useful, there still remains room for research in developing a
complete model of how TRTs become accepted. In par-
ticular, individuals experience challenges to their
understanding in two fundamental areas:
1. Their ability to assess potential threats of what is
tracked/recorded and how it can be used.
2. Their assessment of their capabilities and options to do
anything about those threats, which would enable a
negotiation of when, how, and to what extent infor-
mation about them is disseminated to other parties.
Additionally, the discrepancy between general and
specific concerns regarding data collection, processing, and
dissemination may be caused by the nature of the questions
themselves. Asking in general terms might encourage
people to answer in the most conservative way. Because
anything can happen in the abstract sense, people may tend
to answer conservatively, in order to be on the safe side. If,
on the other hand, people are asked in the context of a
specific technology or activity, such as in connection with a
specific Ubicomp research project, they might instead
reflect on previous experience with that context. Their
answers then would suggest their experiences with that
context (positively or negatively). One may therefore
expect that answers regarding concrete cases might be
more in line with actual behavior and practices than
answers to more abstract questions.
Moreover, the ‘‘novelty effect’’ does not play a strong
role in the understanding of risks and threats when it comes
to novel versus everyday TRTs. This study shows that
participants did not understand the tracking and recording
capabilities of everyday TRTs—technologies they have
used regularly for multiple years.
The data from this study were also analyzed using a
framework designed to evaluate end-user TRTs. There is a
difference in assessing ownership of the recorded data
when technology is end-user based or institutional based.
That class of ownership defines the potential threats
resulting from the possible use of the collected data.
Moreover, the category of TRTs also defines the options
and negotiations possible for an individual with respect to
that technology. Thus understanding of the TRTs them-
selves can be greatly affected depending on whether it is an
end-user or an institutional TRT.
Several open questions remain for this research. For
future work, we will more explicitly compare end-user and
institutional TRTs. We plan to deploy two user studies on
two different technologies using the same study design and
analysis methods. The first study will gauge people’s
understanding of and attitudes towards Bluetooth tracking
and recording. An individual can do this type of recording.6 http://www.boycottbenetton.com/
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Therefore, we will treat this study as an example end-user
technology. The other study will gauge people’s under-
standing of and attitudes towards RFID scanners and
readers. This type of tracking and recording is more typical
of institutions such as companies or schools. We will treat
the latter study as an example of institutional technology.
Explicitly comparing the two will show where the two
categories of technologies are the same and where they
differ. This comparison will hopefully contribute insights
into attitudes surrounding these technologies that may
support the design, deployment, and adoption of new
TRTs.
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